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 The objective of this paper is to determine the impact of the variables of good corporate governance 
on profitability by equity of the banks of Peru during the period 2009 - 2018. The regression anal-
ysis of panel data was applied on a sample of 13 banks in Peru listed on the Lima Stock Exchange. 
Through an econometrics model it was obtained as a result that there was a significant direct rela-
tionship between the general meeting of shareholders and return on equity (p <0.05), which indi-
cates that, the greater the integration of the General Meeting of shareholders in banking companies, 
the greater the profitability of equity for shareholders; which also shows that, the greater the trans-
parency of information, the greater the profitability of equity for shareholders. This evidence pro-
vides beneficial information for supervisory authorities, stakeholders and academics. 
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In a complex and dynamic business environment, a good corporate governance system is needed that increases the profitability 
of companies, improves job performance and reduces risks. Technological restrictions, lack of financial resources and com-
mercial knowledge and the cost of implementing and communicating corporate governance policies throughout the organiza-
tion are some important barriers that many companies face, especially small businesses (Pham et al., 2020). The purpose of a 
corporation is the maximization of shareholder wealth, which is why managers are appointed. However, the decisions they 
make will not necessarily influence the achievement of this objective, that in most cases incurs multi-million-dollar losses in 
different corporations around the world (Kengkathran, 2019). In recent years there has been an increase in corporate scandals 
related to corruption, transformation, financial and accounting information that caused bankruptcy, the reduction in the price 
of the share and the expropriation of assets. That as a whole caused the decrease in the profitability of corporations such as: 
Toshiba Corporation, Tesco, McDonald, Nieschwietz, among others (Mohamad Kamal et al., 2019). The financial system is 
one of the most dynamic sectors of the Peruvian economy, contributing 2.2% to the National Gross Domestic Product for the 
year 2018 (Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, 2018). Possessing a code of good corporate governance provides banking 
institutions with a regulatory framework to rate the conduct and transparency, reduces agency costs that affects the expected 
return and informs the shareholder of the risk to which the entity is affected (Rokibul Kabir et al., 2019). Given the importance 
of deregulation, globalization, increased risk and investor protection, as well as the positive role of the banking sector in 
economic growth, corporate governance is of significant importance for the sustainability of the banking industry, since cor-
porate governance practices help generate sustainable value for the banking industry (Yatim & Yusoff, 2014). Consequently, 
it was proposed to examine the impact of the main pillars of good corporate governance on the banks' equity return, an 




2. Literary review 
2.1 Corporate governance 
Corporate Governance is the management system within the business society, which includes procedures, activities (practices) 
and institutions (standards) established internally or by external forces. It refers primarily to the relationship between share-
holders of the company (owners) and its administration (board and management). This relationship is defined in terms of 
rights, powers and responsibilities of each group (Ortiz, 2014). Corporate governance exists as a mechanism to deal with the 
separation of property and control, and the possible agency conflicts that this separation entails (Casas Tragodara, 2018). At 
the macroeconomic level, the capacity of economies facing financial crises improves. As happened in 2008 (Laffaye, 2008), 
corporate governance compliance allows the existence of more liquid and transparent markets. 
2.2 Code of good corporate governance for Peruvian companies 
Both the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 1999) and Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision (BCBS 1999; BCBS 2006) constituted a set of principles attached to a code, for the good practices of the associations, 
through the delimitation of the structures of the company and the functions that correspond to each one of its actors. In Peru, 
to recognize the importance of the development of the capital market by promoting greater corporate transparency, as well as 
the described advantages of having good corporate governance practices in 2002, a committee formed by eight public sector 
entities was formed and from the private sector, chaired by the then National Supervisory Commission of Companies and 
Securities (CONASEV), today Superintendence of the Securities Market (SMV), with the purpose of establishing principles 
of good corporate governance applicable to Peruvian companies. As a result of this joint effort, in July 2002 the document 
Principles of Good Governance for Peruvian Societies was issued, which was based on the Principles for the Governance of 
Societies issued by the OECD; considering the particular characteristics of Peruvian companies, their shareholding structure 
and the legal framework in which they were developed (Bolsa de Valores de Lima, 2013). More than 10 years after the 
Principles of Good Governance for Peruvian Societies were issued, on February 23, 2012, the Committee for Updating Prin-
ciples of Good Governance for Peruvian Societies was established, which was composed of 14 public institutions and private 
companies of Peru, which, led by the Superintendence of the Securities Market (SMV), published in 2013 the “Code of Good 
Corporate Governance for Peruvian Companies” (which updates the 2002 version). The adoption of good corporate govern-
ance practices by societies promotes a climate of respect for the rights of shareholders and investors in general; contributes to 
generate value, solidity and efficiency in societies; brings with it a better management of the risks to which they are exposed; 
facilitates access to the capital market; leads to a reduction in the cost of capital, as well as greater and better access to sources 
of financing and long-term investment; Among other advantages. Likewise, experience has shown that to the extent that the 
greater transparency and information, the greater the confidence that investors develop in the markets. Good corporate gov-
ernance practices help mitigate the failures that exist in financial markets due to information asymmetry (Bolsa de Valores de 
Lima, 2013). 
The Code of Good Corporate Governance for Peruvian Societies is divided into five pillars: 
a) Shareholder rights: This pillar develops the importance of legal protection for minority and majority investors, thus 
improving governance ratings in less developed countries and encouraging capital movement (Black, Carvalho, & 
Gorga, 2010). 
b) General meeting of shareholders: The structure of the board of creditors in the generation of value is vitally important. 
After conducting an investigation in companies listed on the Indonesian stock exchange, it was determined that the 
structure of the shareholders' meeting has a significant effect on the quality of earnings. In summary, the pillar de-
velops the role and participation of each member within the board (Amin, Pirzada, Puspita, & Arniati, 2019). 
c) The board and senior management: This principle consists in transparency when choosing the members of the board 
of directors, for this purpose, the profiles on the specific requirements or competencies that should be developed for 
the position indicated are promulgated, as well as the rules and conditions for applying. Similarly, the reasons and 
mechanisms for termination by directors are defined and publicly understood (Superintendencia del Mercado de 
Valores, 2014). 
d) Risk and compliance: This principle influences the creation of an appropriate culture in the companies that apply it. 
Not only does it increase value against markets and shareholders, but it will be visible to all Stakeholders. Conse-
quently, it will increase the reputation vis-à-vis consumers, collaborators, suppliers and society in general. This will 
make it possible to establish better synergies, creating new business opportunities, ensuring their stability and market 
projection. Management boards must be responsible for the value of social reputation and, therefore, are sensible to 
respect and comply with good corporate governance, according to risk and compliance (Arrarte, 2019). 
e) Transparency of information: This principle guarantees accurate and timely communication of all relevant business 
issues, including results, financial situation, ownership and governance bodies. Public disclosure is usually required, 
at a minimum, on an annual basis, although some countries require semi-annual or quarterly periodic disclosure, or 
even with high continuity for the development of materials that affect the company (Organización para la Cooperción 
y Desarrollo Económico, 2016). 
f) Transparency is the delivery of information and openness in the decision-making process: The principle of transpar-
ency can be seen from the aspect of the delivery of vision, mission and provision, as well as the information provided 
to staff and the government (Rizqiani Rusydi, et al., 2019) 
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2.3 Bank profitability 
According to Babalola (2012) “Profitability, solvency and liquidity are important goals of banks, profitability is the most 
important one”. Profitability quantifies the extent to which a company produces a rate of return that will be given to investors 
and how much profit the company obtains over a certain period. Profitability is measured using asset performance (ROA) and 
return on capital (ROE). Because the bank's profitability tends to persist over time, a dynamic model that controls a series of 
bank characteristics, fixed effects of the year and fixed effects of the bank is specified (Superintendencia del Mercado de 
Valores, 2014). Return on assets (ROA) determines the capacity of bank management in generating income by employing 
company assets at hand (Ongole & Kusa, 2013). Return on equity (ROE) is also one of the many measures that determine 
how much profits are realized for the company concerning the total amount of shareholders’ equity as indicated on a balance 
sheet. ROE is termed as the percentage rate of return on each unit of equity invested by bank’s shareholders (Kumbirai and 
Webb, 2010). 
3. Method 
3.1 Population and sample 
An investigation was conducted that has a quantitative approach because it is based on numerical measurement; and it is of 
applied type because it was developed based on existing theory. The level of research is correlational for the purpose of 
determining the relationship between the level of compliance with good corporate governance practices and the profitability 
of the Banks of Peru for the period 2009 - 2018. 
The population consisted of 16 banking entities, listed on the pages of the Lima Stock Exchange (BVL), Superintendence of 
Stock Market (SMV) and the Superintendence of Banking and Insurance (SBS) (regulatory entities of companies in Peru). 
Companies that had the required updated information were included and the remaining two were excluded, because they did 
not have the necessary data for the investigation. A sample size of 13 companies was estimated, selected because they had the 
relevant data. 
3.2 Data collection instrument 
Data was obtained from the Lima Stock Exchange, about the Good Corporate Governance of banking entities (right to share-
holders, general meeting of shareholders, the board of directors and senior management, risk and compliance, transparency 
of information) established by the Superintendence of Stock Market (2013). Based on the initial information, the reliability 
analysis was performed on the pillars that make up the code, three were chosen, whose information in the information portals 
was found in its entirety and was considered reliable and you will see by origin of the same for the years 2009 - 2018. Also, 
for the application of profitability the information of the financial statements provided by the regulatory entities was used. 
The leverage control variable was used to adjust the results. 
3.2.1. Study variables 
The use of financial ratios and the definition of the study variables are based on the Lima Stock Exchange (2013) and the 
Superintendence of Stock Market (2013). 
Table 1 
Study variables 
Independent variable: Good Corporate Governance 
P1 Shareholder Law  Parity of treatment. 
 Shareholder participation. 
 No dilution in the share capital share. 
 Information and communication to shareholders. 
 Participation in dividends of the company. 
 Change or takeover. 
 Arbitration for dispute resolution. 
 
(Bolsa de Valores de Lima, 
2013) 
P2 General meeting of shareholders  Function and competence. 
 General Shareholders Meeting Regulations. 
 Call mechanisms. 
 Proposals for agenda ítems. 
 Procedures for exercising the vote. 
 Delegation of vote. 
 Follow-up of agreements of the General Sharehold-
ers Meeting. 
 
(Bolsa de Valores de Lima, 
2013) 
P5 Information transparency  Information policy. 
 Financial statements and annual report. 
 Information on shareholding structure and agree-
ments between shareholders. 
 Corporate governance report. 
 
(Bolsa de Valores de Lima, 
2013) 
 
Dependent variable: Profitability 
ROE Profitability by equity Annual Net Income / average equity. (Aebi, Sabato, & Schmid, 
2012) 
Control variable: Leverage 






3.2.2. Econometric Model 
 
The econometric model used is based on two main estimation techniques: in fixed effects and random effects. Through the 
Hausman test, the most appropriate estimation technique for the investigation was determined. 𝑅𝑂𝐸 =  𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑃1 + 𝛽 𝑃2 + 𝛽 𝑃5 + 𝛽 𝐴𝑃𝐴 + 𝜀  
where: 
P1: Shareholder Law 
P2: General Shareholders Meeting 
P5: Transparency of information 
APA: Leverage 𝛽 : beta coefficient 𝜀 : error term 
i: cross section 




H1: There is a direct relationship between the right pillar of the shareholders and the return on equity (ROE). 
H2: There is a direct relationship between the general shareholders meeting pillar and the return on equity (ROE). 
H3: There is a direct relationship between the information transparency pillar and the return on equity (ROE). 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive result 
Table 2 details the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the study variables of the 13 banking entities of Peru, 
over the period 2009 - 2018. 
 
Table 2  
Summary of descriptive statistics  
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min. Max. 
ROE 130 17.791 9.026 -10.751 37.770 
APA 130 10.182 3.584 2.728 24.390 
P1 130 0.780 0.215 0.214 1.000 
P2 130 0.556 0.188 0.250 1.000 
P5 130 0.730 0.240 0.166 1.000 
 
For the measure of profitability, the average value of the ROE was 17,791, with a standard deviation of 9,026, indicating a 
normal distribution. The minimum ROE was -10.75%, while the maximum was 37.77%. The profitability of equity (ROE) 
determines the profit that shareholders receive in comparison to the net result obtained after one year, the higher the ratio, the 
more beneficial it will be for the taxpayer. Likewise, leverage, a control variable used to adjust the results, indicated an average 
of 10,182 with a standard deviation of 3,584. The minimum was 2.73% and the maximum 24.39%, this ratio combined with 
the capital ratio helps mitigate the systemic risks of the bank. In effect, the results indicate that there is harmony between 
capital and debt in the banks studied. The average of pillar one, right of the shareholders, was 0.780. This means that of the 
total principles that make up the pillar, banks comply with 78%. The standard deviation was 0.215, obtained a minimum of 
21.4% and a maximum of 100%. The average of pillar two, general meeting of shareholders, was 0.556. This means that of 
the total principles that make up the pillar, banks comply with 55.6%. The standard deviation was 0.188, obtained a minimum 
of 25% and a maximum of 100%. The average of pillar five, transparency of information, was 0.730. This means that of the 
total principles that make up the pillar, banks comply with 73%. The standard deviation was 0.240, obtained a minimum of 
16.6% and a maximum of 100%. 
 
4.2. Correlation coefficient test 
Table 3 shows the correlation coefficient test, to measure the strength of the association between study variables. It is observed 
that the variables had a certain degree of correlation with respect to ROE. There is a low correlation regarding shareholders' 
rights (0.3101) and information transparency (0.3667); and very low with respect to the general meeting of shareholders 
(0.0586). Consequently, the multiple regression model was applied with a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 3  
Correlation results 
Variable ROE APA P1 P2 P5 
ROE 1     
APA .2660 1    
P1 .3101 .3271 1   
P2 .0586 .1533 .2109 1  
P5 .3667 .2564 .8520 .3271 1 
 




 Efectos Fijos Efectos aleatorios 
 Coeficiente valor p  Coeficiente P-Value  
Constante 10.4778 .0083 *** 9.72302 .0160 ** 
P1 0.737470 .8966  -.153463 .9780  
P2 -10.7523 .0242 ** -9.26165 .0355 ** 
P5 7.90385 .1390  9.18503 .0760 * 
APA .682234 .0106 ** .651451 .0075 *** 
N 130 130  130 130  
R2 .599937      
CH     .510345  
Note: (*) (**) and (***) represent statistical significance at levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
According to Hausman's contrast, it is determined that the random effects model would be the best option. In addition, R2 




5.1 Relationship between shareholders' rights (Pillar 1) and return on equity (ROE) 
 
The results of the econometric model indicate that there is not enough statistical significance to determine that there is no 
direct relationship between the right pillar of the shareholders and the return on equity, so another study should be carried out 
with the use of different control variables, in order to validate the obtained. The literary review, through the Lima Stock 
Exchange and its study to assess the impact of Corporate Governance on the different stock market variables, suggests that 
the elaboration of corporate governments in each country follows different methodologies and standards. The characteristics 
of each country may or may not facilitate the formation and impact of a corporate government on the different financial 
indicators. Although Peru is governed under a British approach, oriented towards compliance with shareholders' rights and 
improving relations with interest groups, this does not generate a significant impact on profitability due to inefficiency in the 
pillar control and evaluation Quality of corporate governance. Being an emerging country, with companies that have been 
incorporating the code, more rigidity and control are still needed in compliance with it. 
 
5.2 Relationship between general meeting of shareholders (Pillar 2) and return on equity (ROE) 
 
There is a significant direct relationship between the general meeting of shareholders and return on equity (p <0.05). This 
result indicates that the greater the compliance in banking companies of pillar 2 of good corporate governance, the greater the 
profitability of equity for shareholders. According to Sohail, Rasul, & Fatima (2017), in their research, is the internal and 
external governance mechanism enriching the performance of the Pakistan banking sector? The results show us that the inter-
nal mechanisms (board size, participation rate, general meeting of shareholders, administrative property, institutional property, 
ownership of shares of block holders and financial transparency) and external mechanisms (legal infrastructure and protection 
of minority shareholders and the corporate control market), are important to accelerate better performance in companies, these 
mechanisms improve the return on assets (ROA), return on capital (ROE), earnings per share, dividend payment relationships 
in the banking sector.  However, the results do not coincide with the research of Muhammad, Hongxing, Gulzara, Hafiz 
Mustansar, & Qurat Ui (2019) entitled Corporate Governance, Political Connections, and Bank Performance, in which it 
shows that the significant and negative coefficients of the meetings and the board indicates a negative relationship between 
the board and the profitability of the Pakistani banks. This suggests that an increase in board meetings significantly reduces 
ROA, ROE, NIM, and PM. 
 
5.3 Relationship between information transparency (Pillar 5) and return on equity (ROE) 
 
There is a significant direct relationship between information transparency and equity performance (p <0.05). This result 
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indicates that the greater the compliance in banking companies of pillar 5 of good corporate governance, the greater the 
profitability of equity for shareholders. According to Losada & Alkire (2019), in their research “The transformative impact of 
bank transparency on the financial well-being of consumers” shows us in their results that the transparency of banking infor-
mation can increase the financial well-being of consumers, in addition to the effect Positive transparency of banking infor-
mation occurs because the shared information improves positive attitudes towards banks and the perceived financial self-
sufficiency of customers. This research positively contrasts the results obtained, since many banks aim to increase the trans-
parency of their information without a clear understanding of the effects of these actions on consumers, also in the decisions 
of their managers by increasing their ROE. 
5.4 Inverse relationship between the average period of accounts receivable and profitability 
The results indicate that there is a negative correlation between the average collection period (PPC) and the profitability of 
assets (ROA), with a −0.000693844, which is evidenced in Table 4. The results about the PPC imply that the shorter the days 
or the average collection period, the greater the return on assets, this is because in the shortest time available cash is obtained 
for the company, and that they can be used to invest, comply with obligations or debts. The average for PPC was 78.60 days. 
This means that companies on average waited an average of 50 days to collect cash from credit sales or that approximately 
every 50 days they receive payments from their customers. This implies that companies in the industrial sector improve their 
profitability when the time in days to make their payments to customers is less. 
5.5 Direct relationship between the average period of accounts payable and profitability 
The results indicate that there is a positive correlation between the average payment period (PPP) and the profitability of 
assets (ROA), with a 0.000249050, which is shown in Table 4. The average PPP was 54 days, which means that payments to 
suppliers are made on average every 54 days, which also implies that companies in the industrial sector should not take into 
account the analysis of accounts payable to improve their operating margin. According to Penfold, Oneto & Rodriguez (2015), 
the board must have the power and self-sufficiency, such as the balance of knowledge and experience that allows it to define 
independently, safely and with a long-term objective the policy directions raised by which the management administration 
will be examined. Consequently, the fifth pillar intends to examine the mechanisms where the Board of Directors is structured, 
the development of designation of the members of the board of directors, if the ideal characteristics for its selection are taken 
into account, if it establishes removal mechanisms, if it establishes the determined time of the position and if the Board of 
Directors is gradually nominated. Likewise, if the directory profile information and the existence of autonomous directors are 
structured. Nur (2019) also concludes that Good Corporate Governance does not affect the profitability of Islamic banking 
entities (ROE), which means that the better the score of the Good Corporate Governance indicator, the lower the value of 
(ROE), does not guarantee the bank's profitability increase. 
From which it is concluded that in an econometric way the impact of good corporate governance is positive and especially 
significant. Through the estimation of elasticities, it was found that, with respect to the other variables, corporate governance 
has a greater impact on the profitability variables. The better management of good corporate governance, the greater the 




Through the econometrics model the relationship between the pillars general meeting of shareholders and transparency of the 
information with the profitability by equity of the banks of Peru has been evidenced. Although the pillar of shareholders' rights 
has a negative relationship with the return on equity, according to what is obtained in the model, it cannot be considered 
significant. For this reason, other economics variables should be considered for future research. As for the aforementioned, it 
is deduced that it is essential to have a good business management complying with the principles already referred to above of 
corporate governance; providing the investor with confidence, as well as consequently reducing the effect of bad decisions on 
their part, poor administrative management and mitigating agency problems; giving them the authority and self-sufficiency 
of being able to have truthful and transparent knowledge of the policy guidelines set forth in the management administration. 
This has a positive impact on ROE, as well as the economic benefits of banking companies. In addition to increasing the 
efficiency of the economy, there is a need for strengthening the economic growth of the country. Although the model based 
on which the code of good Peruvian corporate governance was developed is British, the national situation influences the 
results. More control and supervision of each of the principles proposed in the pillars is necessary. Although most of the 
preliminary results are as planned, it is necessary to carry out a study with the use of more control variables that allow for 
better routing of the relationship between the pillars and profitability. It is worth mentioning that companies in Peru are just 
incorporating the use of the code of good corporate governance, and that the study focused on the banking sector and only 
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